Enabling Peer-to-Peer Swarming for Multi-Commodity Dissemination

24 Mar
Thursday, 03/24/2011 5:00am to 7:00am
Ph.D. Thesis Defense

Daniel Menasche

Computer Science Building, Room 151

Peer-to-peer swarming, as used by BitTorrent, is one of the de facto solutions for content dissemination in today's Internet. By leveraging resources provided by users, peer-to-peer swarming is a simple, scalable and efficient mechanism for content distribution. Although peer-to-peer swarming has been widely studied for a decade, prior work has focused on the dissemination of one commodity (a single file). This thesis focuses on the multi-commodity case.

We have discovered through measurements that a vast number of publishers currently disseminate multiple files in a single swarm (bundle). The first contribution of this thesis is a model for content availability. We use the model to show that, when publishers are intermittent, bundling K files increases content availability exponentially as function of K. When there is a stable publisher, we consider content availability among peers (excluding the publisher). Our second contribution is the estimate of the dependency of peers on the stable publisher, which is useful for provisioning purposes as well as in deciding how to bundle. To this goal, we propose a new metric, swarm self-sustainability, and present a model that yields swarm self-sustainability as a function of the file size, popularity and service capacity of peers. Then, we investigate reciprocity and the use of barter that occurs among peers. As our third contribution, we prove that the loss of efficiency due to the download of unrequested content to enforce direct reciprocity, as opposed to indirect reciprocity, is at most two in a class of networks without relays. Finally, we study algorithmic and economic problems faced by enterprises who leverage swarming systems and who control prices and bundling strategies. As our fourth contribution, we present two formulations of the optimal bundling problem, and prove that one is NP hard whereas the other is solvable by a greedy strategy. From an economic standpoint, we present conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium between publishers and peers.

Advisor: Donald F. Towsley